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The use of scenario planning in urban and regional planning practice has grown in 
the last decade as one way to face uncertainty. However, in adapting scenario planning 
from its origins in the business sector, planners have eliminated two key components: 1) 
the use of multiple scenarios, and 2) the inclusion of diverse organizations, people and 
interests through deep deliberations. We argue that this shift limits the ability for planners 
to plan for multiple plausible and futures that are shaped by an increasing number of 
diverse actors. In this paper, we use case study research to examine how uncertainty was 
considered in four scenario planning processes. We analyzed and compared the cases 
based on analytical categories related to multiple futures and diversity. We found that the 
processes that used multiple, structurally distinct scenarios explored a wider range of 
topics and issues shaping places. All four relied heavily on professional stakeholders as the 
scenario developers, limiting public input. Only one of those processes that included 
multiple futures captured the differential effects that scenarios would have on diverse 
people and interests. All in all, the purpose of the scenario planning drove the participant 




Introduction    
Planning practice necessarily must deal with imperfect foresight to plan for 
uncertain futures in diverse communities. To plan for an uncertain future, planning 
practice relies on modes such as visioning, forecasting, and scenario selection. These 
methods allow planners to identify possible directions for a community and then chart a 
path to achieve that future possibility. Planners produce a single vision, rely on a single 
forecast, select a single scenario, and create a single plan in an attempt to reach that 
desired future (Hopkins and Zapata 2007). Such an approach to planning fails to account 
for the ‘radical’ uncertainty of the future and does not account for the diversity of publics 
that inherently shape the future (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). The question explored in this 
paper is: how does ‘scenario planning’, as an alternative to the aforementioned methods, 
account for these uncertainties and diversities? Uncertainty and diversity crucially interact 
with one another and public planning has the ability to harness them both to create better 
plans and planning methods. 
The scenario-planning process gained notoriety when Shell Oil Company utilized it 
to successfully weather the 1970s oil crisis (Wack 1985; Van der Heijden 1996; Schwartz 
1996).  In the corporate approach, scenario planning generates multiple, plausible 
scenarios for a company or an industry and then constructs plans around these multiple 
futures. Scenario planning in planning practice was initially widely used in land-use and 
transportation planning (Myers and Kitsue 2000; Avin and Dembner 2001).  Contrast this 
to traditional planning, which looks at a planning horizon (20-30 years into the future) 
scenario planning is expected to look at plausible events that may or may not be in the 
planners’ control, nevertheless, need to be addressed. When these events happen may 
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matter because of lead-time considerations, however in general, horizons take on a 
secondary roles.  
However, its use in planning has deviated from the corporate use in two ways. First, 
scenario planning is used to develop preferred-scenario alternatives; this is in plans where 
a single alternative or “preferred scenario” is selected. Second, scenario planning usually 
calls for ‘wide participation’ rather than ‘deep participation’ of highly diverse participants. 
Because it is logistically infeasible to include  ‘wide’ and ‘deep’ participation (Mutz 2006), 
public planning processes usually solicit information from either a large sample (through 
surveys and charettes) or from a small number of ‘professional participants’ (through a 
limited number of workshops). These particular adaptations mean that planners miss the 
opportunity for deep deliberation amongst diverse people; this limits the representation of 
diversity within places as well as pronounced differences between them. 
In this paper we   briefly examine the standard scenario planning literature to 
extract various lessons for public planning, especially in dealing with uncertainty. We 
examine four scenario-planning processes to identify the practices in which they did or did 
not account for these issues. Each case elucidates the strengths, weaknesses, and 
challenges of scenario planning. We argue that planning practices will be more effective in 
preparing for future uncertainty through the inclusion of multiple, structurally distinct 
scenarios generated from deep deliberation amongst highly diverse community members.  
Future Uncertainty 
When a community chooses to collectively plan for a particular future, it sets a clear 
path of action and emphasizes shared goals (Isserman 1984; Wachs 1982). However, such 
an approach to planning is problematic for two reasons.  First, planners and communities 
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do not anticipate, prepare for and respond to the natural uncertainty of whether or not 
such a future will materialize (Shearer 2005; Quay 2010; Chakraborty et al. 2011). Second, 
conventional planning that relies on a traditional “predict and plan” approach fails to 
account for the diversity of publics comprising a community (Myers and Kitsue 2000; 
Abbot 2005). 
Multiple futures. In their work on network governance, Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) 
identify uncertainty as one of the five challenges that planners and policymakers face and 
ask them to urgently respond to today’s ‘radical’ uncertainty. Quay (2010) argues that 
uncertainty could be better addressed through anticipatory governance, which considers 
and prepares for a range of plausible futures, specifically discussing scenario planning. 
Preparing for multiple futures allows planners to consider a range of issues that could 
shape their community. They can also identify what is within their community’s control, 
and what is beyond it. Such a planning mode recognizes that planners cannot always chart 
a path to the future and steer the boat there.   
Scenario planning in the business sector generally focuses on the development of 
long- or medium-range futures (approximately 15 – 20 years) (Smith 2007).  However, the 
time horizons are largely unimportant to scenario planning; instead the focus is on events. 
That is instead of painting the picture of the future at a given horizon year, the idea of 
scenario planning is to describe a process and key events that present fork the river (in 
Wack’s terms). To be sure, most scenario planning processes from Shell’s own scenarios, 
United Nation’s scenarios for HIV in Africa, and Singapore’s National Scenario Planning 
exercise have a horizon year ranging from 10-40 years out into the future. The further the 
horizon year, the greater the uncertainty, the greater the number of forks and therefore 
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larger number of scenarios to bound the uncertainty (Intriligator & Sheshinski 1986).   
It is also important to recognize that multiple futures in this approach to scenario 
planning are not just sensitivity analyses that characterize many projection studies such as 
high, medium and low (Oglivy & Schwartz 1998). They are not the outcomes of minor 
changes in the input conditions and variables of the same ‘model’ of the process, but 
outcomes of radically different and perhaps incommensurable models that highlight 
different aspects of reality1. Furthermore, some of these futures might include 
discontinuous ruptures such as a natural disasters, shift in technologies, dramatic changes 
in the institutional structure imposed externally, all of which cannot be encapsulated in 
futures that look to the past for direction. Such ‘black swan’ events can shift the paradigm 
in which the region operates. Even when a cataclysmic event does not happen, scenarios 
can challenge people to reconsider underlying and fundamental assumptions about how a 
place functions, sometimes articulating these assumptions for the first time. For instance, 
in Monteverde, Costa Rica, scenarios challenged community members to consider what 
kind of economic framework they wanted to operate in – one dependent on tourism or one 
with a diversified economy (Harwood & Zapata, 2006). Thinking through these 
combinations of events and processes will necessarily involve planning for and with 
multiple futures rather than selecting a single preferred future. 
Diversity. Diversity refers to a wide range of ‘categories’ of people in places. What 
categories of diversity relevant for a planning process are contextual to a place and may 
include, for example, employment type, educational level, political affiliation, geography 
(i.e., rural or urban), different jurisdictions and organizations, race, or country of origin. 
1 We are not necessarily referring to computer simulation models but about mental models that necessarily simplify 
and ignore certain aspects of reality while emphasizing others (e.g. Box & Draper 1987).  
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Various individuals can have different opinions and preferences, even while affirming 
common background social, cultural and linguistic norms, e.g. .people representing 
different interest groups and jurisdictions within a metropolitan region. Or different 
groups can have incommensurable background norms that make communication and 
articulation of preferences and positions much harder. It is easier to account for the former 
rather than the latter type of diversity.  
In planning processes, including diverse groups of people that share common 
background norms, help articulate one kind of scenarios. Diversity in opinion help us 
create radically different scenarios and may even help us reach a common consensus about 
action. On the other hand, scenarios that account for incommensurable background norms 
can help us empathize with others that are sufficiently different than ourselves by creating 
the same scenarios from multiple perspectives. Ideally, the final product, multiple 
scenarios, tells the stories of different futures for diverse publics. Including multiple 
futures eliminates the need to create a single story about a future where one population 
wins out over another or a homogenized vision of the future is created in the frame of one 
dominant group, reflecting the disproportionate effect on specific groups.   
An additional frame exists for the consideration of diversity in scenario planning. 
Here, diversity matters as a way to further creative thinking that leads to more robust 
scenarios (Ogilvy 2002). Ogilvy and Schwartz (1998) describe the function of diversity 
within a corporation diversity within a corporation:   
The full spectrum of organizational functions should also be 
present finance, R&D, manufacturing, marketing, and different 
executive levels. Internal diversity is critical to the success of 
the project. The key to failure, on the other hand, is the 
exclusion of people who are unorthodox, challenging thinkers 




The participation across the spectrum that Ogilvy and Schwartz reference leads 
organizations to uncover ‘black swans’ and prepare for radical uncertainty. In planning 
processes, we can be limited in the diversity of actors within a process. The construction of 
scenarios occurs through careful deliberation amongst diverse participants in a small 
group setting, consistent with recommended by collaborative planning scholars (Forester 
2006, Umemoto 2001, & Healey 1998). Here, empathy can be created, differences 
articulated, and radical uncertainty discovered. This transformative learning (Zapata 2013) 
that can occur for the participants and reflected in scenarios created, depends on how high 
the degree of diversity is within the group.  
Further, we know that the actions of multiple agents will shape a place’s future; 
however, we cannot say with certainty which agents they will be. For instance, the 
demographic concentration of Cuban-Americans and Haitian immigrants in Miami area in 
the later part of the 20th century has profoundly changed the character of the  city and 
continues to influence the spatial structure of the area (Nijman 2010).  If the future 
residents are unlikely to be similar to and share the same values as the current residents of 
the city, inclusion of multiple perspectives helps us to avoid the mistake of thinking that the 
future will necessarily be a reflection of the present and would necessarily be experienced 
in similar ways as the present (Scearce and Fulton 2004). Thus, scenarios that take a broad 
view of diversity, accounting for differences in norms and incommensurable backgrounds, 
help us create radically different scenarios.  Once these scenarios are created, different 
groups can use them to make different collective and private plans in response to those 
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scenarios. Such scenarios can help planners fulfill Sandercock’s (2004) call for futures 
planning that is audacious, creative, political, and therapeutic.  
Methodology 
In this paper, we employ a case study methodology. Case study research is 
appropriate when the researcher asks “how” questions, examines current situations, and 
does not need to control or influence behaviour (Yin 2009). Case study research can also 
draw on multiple sources of data, which adds flexibility to the research design. In this 
paper we examine four scenario-planning cases. Each case was examined for how the 
process incorporated diversity and how it responded to the creation of multiple futures. 
The cases were selected for the purposes of comparison and contrast using several 
categories of analysis. Chaskin (2001) as cited by (Yin 2009) relied on a two comparative 
cases.  
The research design follows the COSMOS Corporation’s framework for considering 
multiple cases, as discussed by Yin; each case was analysed independently and then 
comparatively. As discussed below, we selected each case based on its implementation of 
scenario planning to be examined for its treatment of multiple futures and diversity, what 
Flyvbjerg (2006) refers to as “maximum variation” cases. Each case brings a different 
insight into how scenario planning addresses diversity and multiple futures.  
We identified three of the four cases due to our own primary research on, 
observation of, or direct participation in the planning process. The fourth case, Envision 
Utah, was selected given its prominence in the field and recognition as an outstanding 
planning process. We do not endeavor to suggest that these cases are exhaustive, but we do 
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argue that in-depth exploration of the cases helps us tease out the key features of scenario 
planning as currently practiced. Other examples of scenario planning or scenario 
preference selection exist (e.g. Bartholomew 2007); however, these four processes 
provided a range of activities that add insights into how planning can respond to prepare 
for future uncertainties. The relationships of the authors to the projects and how data were 
collected are presented in [Table 1].  
[Table 1 Case selection and data collection procedure about here] 
 
For each case, we considered specific analytical categories related to either the use of 
multiple futures in the process and the treatment of diversity. For multiple futures, the 
categories included:  
1) Structurally distinct versus option alternative scenarios: Here we examined how 
multiple futures were addressed in the scenario-planning process. Option 
alternatives are those that are used in forecasting (e.g. High-Medium-Low) and 
are typically used to select (or agree upon) a particular forecast. While each of 
those option alternatives can be evaluated on multiple attributes/indicators, in 
general, the options are usually arranged on a single graded scale for facilitating 
choice.  Whereas, structurally different scenarios help us contemplate multiple 
distinct future and contemplate about them; in general the scenarios are largely 
incommensurable 
2) Scenario use during and following deliberations: Following from the earlier 
category, we were interested in how the scenarios and the deliberations were 
10 
 
co-constructed. We are interested in, if the different modes of scenario planning 
had propensities for different types of participation.  
3) Use of base case: The “base case” or “business-as-usual” (BAU) scenario is used 
frequently in planning activities. We wanted to see if processes that were 
focused on multiple futures would still employ a base case and if so, we 
discerned how was the base case created and for what purpose.  We believed 
that the BAU case would be used as a catalyst to raise alarms about the future.  
4) Use after: We wanted to see how organizations used multiple futures in their 
work long after the scenarios themselves were  complete.  The end of scenario 
planning is not to create scenarios but to prepare for them and we wanted to 
examine if and how these ends were met. 
For the treatment of diversity we considered the following categories: 
 
1) Scenario generation: We examined who created the scenarios and how they were 
created (i.e. from computer models, stakeholder perspectives, or some 
combination of both). What scenarios were generated and how deeply the 
interconnections were explored is contingent on the participants’ expertise, 
background, trust and involvement. 
2) Public engagement: The wide range of public engagement was carefully 
analyzed. Our main points of interest included who participated in the process, 
how they participated, and when they participated. We examined the different 
perspective offered by participants and distinguished between public-input 
activities and education activities. We believed that broad based public 
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engagement would be limited. Instead, the focus would be on major elites and 
stakeholders.  
3) Representation of diversity: We examined what kinds of issues related to 
diversity were raised. We also looked at how diversity was represented in the 
final scenarios.  
4) Use after: We examined if there were variances in how various groups that 
participated in the process used the scenarios for their own purposes long after 
the scenario construction was complete and if so with what degree of 
effectiveness.  
 The study contributes to what Xiang and Clarke (2003) argue is scenariology – studying 
scenarios.  
Cases 
We first provide brief descriptions of each case and identify some of the key points 
pertinent to each case. We then elaborate upon these points in the following section, 
comparing them across the cases based on the 8 elements above. 
Envision Utah 
In 1997, Envision Utah was created to educate the public and decision-makers about 
the issues and consequences associated with rapid growth in the greater Wasatch area, a 
ten-county region (Briggs 2008).  Under the guidance of the 100-person steering 
committee, Envision Utah set out to educate the public about the growth projected for the 
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region, to gather its input about how to accommodate this growth, and to create political 
and public willingness to proactively address projected-growth concerns.  
The input from the public was used to generate models and corresponding maps to 
identify possible scenarios that the region could pursue. The four scenarios ranged from a 
low-density alternative with predominantly auto-oriented development to a high-density 
transit-oriented alternative with more compact growth and higher levels of infill and 
redevelopment. Scenarios were used to generate public discussion about the future growth 
of the region and then unofficially voted on by community members via newspaper and 
online ballots. The public selected “Scenario C” that focused on walkable communities yet 
did not have significant increases in densities. Envision Utah today continues its work 
informing planning and policy in Utah. The organization and its original planning process 
have been widely recognized for their innovative, participatory work. 
Maryland Scenario Project 
Since 2007, the Maryland Scenario Project (MSP) has been an ongoing effort to 
promote regional decision-making and overcome the fragmentary nature of governance 
within a 200-mile radius of Washington DC. The area comprises of two states, an 
autonomous federal district, two Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) and many 
other regulatory and non-regulatory entities.  Spearheaded by the National Center for 
Smart Growth (NCSG) at the University of Maryland, MSP sought to develop technical as 
well as institutional capacity to address the inter-related urban problems.  
The Maryland Scenario Advisory Group (SAG) was set up to oversee the 
identification forces that drive urbanization and future public investments, regulations, and 
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programs that might generate outcomes that would be consistent with a Reality Check 
exercise that drove the development of the MSP. The SAG first conceived of the regional 
spatial patterns of development that included: an urban diamond that concentrated growth 
in the four different cities of central Maryland, a “State-preferred” alternative that 
concentrated growth in Priority Funding Areas (PFA), and a “business-as-usual” alternative 
that projected the existing patterns of growth into the future. SAG then identified the 
drivers of urban development in the region that were considered important and uncertain.  
These spatial patterns and drivers informed the model-building part of the MSP, 
which was driven primarily by the staff at NCSG. This process included loosely-coupled 
economic, demographic, land use, and transportation models that encompassed the region 
but also were tailored to be responsive to the identified drivers. The scenarios were 
generated from various inputs including different patterns in Federal spending and fuel 
prices as well as internal choices such as new transit and transportation investments. 
These scenarios were supposed to inform the development of the Maryland State 
Development Plan  
Region Forward 2050 
Greater Washington 2050 is spearheaded by the Metropolitan Washington DC 
Council of Governments (MWCOG), an MPO for the eight-county region and a number of 
independent cities in Virginia encompassing metropolitan Washington DC. In 2008, as a 
part of the planning effort to coordinate investments and regulations in the region, MWCOG 
convened interested parties from various jurisdictions and interest groups in a year-long 
exercise. The main thrust of the project was to produce a compact to promote shared 
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regional goals. To this end, MWCOG created the Greater Washington 2050 coalition headed 
by the chairman of the Fairfax County, Virginia Board of Supervisors. Planning directors, 
mayors of various cities, and representatives from transit agencies were part of this 
advisory group. Thus, the group included key decision-makers in the region as well as 
representatives from advocacy groups such as Natural Resources Defense Council and 
Coalition for Smarter Growth.  
A day-long scenario planning exercise was commissioned that resulted in a 
document titled “Big Moves”. The exercise was based on four different possible future 
directions in the region: “Hot and Gridlocked”, “HiTech Green”, “Federal Government 
Dispersal”, and “Cooperation in Hard Times”. These scenarios were constructed by asking 
for input from a wide range of experts and were drafted by the MWCOG staff before the 
day-long exercise. The scenarios are descriptive stories of how various futures might 
unfold for the Washington region and contain various jurisdictions and locations as 
characters ("Greater Washington 2050" 2009). MWCOG presented these scenarios to the 
subgroups within the larger exercise. Each subgroup was tasked to come up with a set of 
strategies that would be useful in one particular future assigned to the group. The resulting 
strategies were collated and presented to the larger group; they included pursuing transit-
oriented and green-oriented economic development. In January 2010, MWCOG and 21 local 
jurisdictions approved the Washington Compact2.  This compact stated common goals, such 
as the preservation of affordable housing and the promotion of regional activity centers, 
while preserving the authority and responsibility of the different jurisdictions in 
formulating their own actions towards the achievement of these goals. 
2 The compact can be found at http://www.regionforward.org/compact (Accessed July 25, 2011) 
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Valley Futures Project 
The Valley Futures Project (VFP) examined how four futures could play out in the 
Central Valley of California. Coordinated by the Great Valley Center (GVC), a non-profit 
organization, the goal of the project was to spark a conversation about the region’s 
challenges. For GVC, the aim of this conversation was to build capacity for regional 
planning and governance in order to address these challenges. 
All four scenarios were included in the final project materials in which each future 
was described as plausible. The scenarios were based on how key issues and forces would 
play out over twenty years from a starting point in the present.  The scenarios were created 
by 25–30 community leaders, with support from process consultants and the convening 
staff of GVC during a couple of two-day retreats. Community leaders were asked to 
contribute their expertise and knowledge about the region, which would be rendered on a 
graph. One “axis” group focused on issues that were external to the control of the region, 
specifically, national, economic and climatic disaster conditions. The other “axis” group 
synthesized issues that the region could directly influence, such as educational attainment 
and job training. 
Once the description of the “axes” were completed, community participants then 
created narratives detailing the future scenario that was located in each quadrant of the 
final graph. GVC then assembled these narratives and repurposed them into fictional 
stories, each centered on a fictional but realistic character. The final product included the 
presentation of these stories in booklets, videos, radio segments, and a website. In the 
printed materials, indicators of how to know which scenario was unfolding followed the 
story. The organization also created facilitation guides to train people on how to discuss 
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the scenarios and how to integrate discussion about the scenarios into a high school 
curriculum. 
Comparative Analysis 
In the previous section, we described the four scenario-planning cases. Each case 
offers insight into how scenario planning is being used in planning practice. Table 2 
summarizes these differences among the cases across the two main and supporting 
analytical categories. We discuss each category and the similarities and differences 
between the cases below.  
 Multiple Futures. Future uncertainty can be planned for through the creation of 
multiple futures. These organizations used multiple futures to fulfill different goals. 
Broadly, scenarios were created and used to address a pressing concern – most of them 
tied to growth management, at least initially.  
1) Structurally distinct or option alternatives. Except for EU, all the three created 
scenarios that are structurally different. The scenarios in EU on all the major indicators 
such as infrastructure costs and water demand are arranged on a linearly graded scale 
with Scenario D (the most dense pattern) scoring the best and Scenario A (continuation 
of current trends) scoring the worst.  MSP, VFP and RF, on the other hand, created 
structurally distinct scenarios and one was not selected as preferred. The scenarios 
acknowledged things that they could not control (i.e., natural disaster, global economy). 
However, the processes also identified issues within the influence of the regions. The 
processes explored how actors (organizations and individuals) might respond if certain 
events transpired such as a significant drought in the agricultural CA Central Valley. 
Hence, some organizations identified futures for a community to work towards 
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achieving. Others focused on future uncertainty and how they could respond to that 
uncertainty. There is a state preferred scenario in the MSP, however, because the 
scenario planning was driven by a research center, it did not push for preferring this 
scenario over others though the name might suggest otherwise. 
2) Use during the process. Broadly, the scenarios were used to obtain agreement between 
stakeholders about either issues that would shape the future of the community or 
actions to take to achieve a particular future. Specifically, RF wanted participants 
familiar with one another to collectively consider the future in order to better prepare 
for possible scenarios and thus sought a commitment from area jurisdictions on how to 
achieve collective regional goals. The VFP brought strangers together to consider the 
plausible futures to build capacity for regional planning and create scenarios that could 
be used to then educate and inspire public action. In EU, the organizers sought to reach 
agreement about community values and then about a specific scenario that would chart 
future development. Finally, in the MSP, the purpose of the exercise was to be partially 
academic but also to engage the various key agencies in the regional planning across the 
different metro regions and multiple states. MSP used the scenarios to test assumptions 
about the future.  Thus, during the process the emphasis for RF was on identifying 
actions to achieve collective regional goals, in VFP to build capacity within leaders and 
to write scenarios, in EU to choose a scenario, and in MSP to test assumptions about the 
future.  
3) Base Case. All four planning exercises used a contrasting scenario. While the scenarios 
are meant to contrast with one another, pairwise comparisons are easy to make and the 
existence of a base case reduces the number of pairwise comparisons that are made. 
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BAU or base cases have been criticized for being “strawmen”, something meant to scare 
people into action. In particular, the impetus of many planning processes is that the 
current situation ought not to be left unchecked and therefore something needs to be 
done. Given the projection of the trends into the future, the situation becomes 
untenable and therefore serves as a call for action.  
While some of the future scenarios in the processes were negative, each used 
something resembling a base case – or a case that plays out negative trajectories – for 
comparison and educational purposes. In the case of the VFP, the three less-desirable 
scenarios were used to spur group action towards the preferred scenario even when 
there is no explicit acknowledgement of the preferred option. RF and MSP used a 
scenario against which they measured every other outcome. EU relied on a traditional 
BAU scenario where current trends were extrapolated to demonstrate the negative 
impacts on the region and to spur action against that future. All relied on contrasting 
future scenarios to demonstrate the different directions a community could take. This 
contrasting helped participants go beyond just understanding the consequences of their 
current actions to understanding the nuances of the futures that may occur. 
4) Use after the process. For EU and the VFP, both the creation of the scenarios 
and then public use of the scenarios were central to meeting project objectives. In EU, 
the scenarios were created with public input, in part to meet goals of public 
involvement and to create scenarios more like to be accepted by the public. However, 
one was expected to be selected as preferred. The VFP intended that the scenario-
creation process would inform the thinking and knowledge of regional leaders while 
also relying on their knowledge to develop plausible scenarios. For EU and VFP, the 
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scenarios were intended to serve as educational and advocacy tools. For MSP and 
Region Forward, the creation or use of the scenarios was never meant to extend to the 
general public.  The use of the scenarios was essentially limited to the spur the myriad 
of jurisdictions and agencies into action either towards collective goals and, in some 
cases, towards particular goals. 
Diversity. All four processes incorporated diverse viewpoints across various 
spectrums. Yet the function of these conceptions of diversity and how it would impact the 
processes varied considerably. 
1)  Scenario generation. The processes relied on a combination of computer models, 
expert input, and community member participation. EU and MSP combined large 
and small group discussions and consultants to iteratively develop and test 
scenarios. The starting scenarios were based on large public input sessions where 
users provided preferences. In the EU community values workshops, groups voted 
on density patterns and urban design aesthetics. Consultants compiled data 
provided by community members and then ran models to develop the scenarios. 
The scenarios were then reviewed by stakeholders and vetted. 
The VFP and RF, alternatively, relied on community leaders and experts to 
construct all parts of the scenarios based on their knowledge and experience. In RF 
and VFP, community leaders were interviewed and in RF consultants developed the 
scenarios with a select group and then shared them at a workshop. In the VFP, the 
interviews were used to prepare the consultants for discussions that might arise. 
The scenarios were created in the workshops. 
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With a focus on planning expertise and key stakeholders in the processes, the 
depth of coverage on a specific issue may have been large, but the perspectives of 
the stakeholders drove the identification of and thus limited the breadth of issues. If 
part of the purpose of scenario planning is to spur creative thinking about the 
multiple ways the future can unfold and prepare for that future, it takes on a 
particular salience in scenario planning processes in two ways: Firstly, limited 
representation of diversity in the process limits the breadth of issues that are 
considered. The VFP was intended to focus on growth-management issues. 
However, in working with a corporate-oriented scenario-planning firm, the GVC was 
pushed to think about regional planning topics more broadly. The participants from 
a wide range of backgrounds drove the conversation in a direction where the 
scenarios were structured around issues related to social inequality.  
Secondly, an insufficient range of diversity can lead to foregone conclusions 
and biases. Essentially, with more perspectives, there will be a decrease in the 
likelihood for bias (Taleb 2007). In RF, for example, each subgroup during the one-
day workshop had representatives from multiple organizations, which contributed 
to the endorsement of strategies that are relatively uncontroversial. In a thought-
experiment involving a suburban county (Fairfax County, VA, for instance),  Federal 
government dispersal would disproportionately affect the suburban communities 
more than the District of Columbia at the same time that the burden of affordable 
housing generated by pressure for green development would land on the District 
more than the suburban counties. In Region Forward, neither the district nor these 
suburban counties had a chance to articulate, at least in public, what their responses 
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would be if each of those futures were to be realized.  Thus, even while the diverse 
jurisdictions were represented, their representation was not effectively harnessed. 
2) Public engagement.  While the VFP developed their scenarios with 
community members, even this process faced challenges in the next area of analysis- 
public engagement. As alluded to in the previous sections, the degree to which the 
public could engage in the processes lacked in most cases. If the project conveners 
did not a priori identify an interest as being central to the process, they were not 
invited to the steering committees or targeted to attend any public workshops, 
where they existed. And, even the large workshops EU held and MSP’s originator, 
RealityCheck, the specified nature of the discussions (growth management) 
determined beforehand who might choose to participate. These workshops did not 
actually create the scenarios. They provided input that was used by planning 
professionals to create them. While some were then used by stakeholder groups to 
hold deliberations, community members were not present for those deliberations. 
This limits the opportunity for people to develop empathy for one another.  
The VFP project focused on minor elites and community members in order to 
bring in a broad representation of issues, experiences, and ways of thinking world-
view, including farm-worker organizers and presidents of two-person non-profit 
organizations. In other words, the project perceived stakeholders to be not only 
elected officials and large business and civic organizations. In three of the processes, 
the participants who created or most immediately created the scenarios largely 
included major and minor elites. Thus, community participation largely consisted of 
people from positions of power, such as elected officials, civil servants, and major 
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civic organizations, including chambers of commerce and United Way. Still, the 
participants were considered community leaders, not “average Joes,” and the group 
by the nature of the process was small, revealing the challenge of balancing small 
group deliberation with public engagement. 
3) Representation of diversity. Diversity is represented also in the kinds of narratives 
that told the scenarios. The narratives in RF carefully avoided identifying specific 
groups of people or even specific sub-regions that would be differentially affected3. 
This is not surprising because the scenario exercises were meant to create a sense of 
urgency and unity among various jurisdictions to create a commonly accepted 
framework.  
The VFP on the other hand intended all four scenarios to be used after the 
conclusion of the project, allowing for different perspectives to remain in the public 
eye. The VFP narratives captured how different groups of people would be affected 
in each of the futures. Returning to the VFP riot example, and tying back the role of 
multiple futures, one participant found the likelihood of riots implausible. She was 
willing to accept their inclusion in the scenarios because there were multiple 
scenarios, an acknowledgement that there could be multiple paths for the future.  
MSP is more specific about the kinds of sub-regions that are affected by 
different region (e.g. it specifically focuses on what different counties might be able 
to do in response to different futures); however, the stories that MSP tells are in 
numbers. They are a product of complicated modeling exercises and are firmly 
planted in the decision-theoretic analytical frameworks. MSP did not identify how 
3 Some scenarios in RF do specify Washington, DC, Virginia and Maryland, but only to the extent to which regional 
differences are highlighted. 
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different groups of people might be differentially impacted nor did it solicit input 
from a carefully selected diverse group of people as the GVF did4. 
4)  Use of scenarios: The scenarios were used by different groups in different ways. EU 
used the scenarios to help community members visualize future development 
patterns and understand the impacts of these patterns on the future.  Hence the idea 
of the EU scenarios were visual and quantitative indicators of what different futures 
might be and the tradeoffs.  Since EU aimed for wide participation rather than deep 
participation, the scenarios served not as an advocacy tool for different interest 
groups, but as a mechanism to build broad based support for a particular preferred 
future. RF scenarios, on the other hand, were used by MWCOG to create a common 
framework of goals that are regionally palatable to different jurisdictions. The 
federal government dispersal and the cooperation in the Hard Times scenario were 
essentially used as a background over which a new plan called Economy Forward 
was created. The strategies that were formulated in a response to federal 
government dispersal scenario were fungible in a situation that materialized few 
years later with the “Fiscal Cliff” and decreased federal spending. While no direct 
link is acknowledged, at least one jurisdiction (Montgomery County) enacted an 
initiative to incentivize biotech firms5.  The scenarios created in the MSP were not 
used to create Plan Maryland nor could we could find any evidence of organizations 
other than NCSG using the scenarios to prepare for the multiple futures. The GVC 
used the VFP to raise awareness about issues. Some organizations and people asked 
4 The scenario advisory group for MSP was carefully selected to include key decision makers and technical experts. 
5 It should be noted that this may not mitigate the lessening importance of federal government in the region as the 
biotech cluster may be dependent on federal entities such as National Institutes of Health and U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration who are headquartered in Montgomery County. 
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for the GVC to present the scenarios to help launch their own planning activities. 
However, the widespread living room conversations and advocacy by other 
organizations and individuals did not occur.  
 
Conclusions 
 These four scenario-planning processes offer insight into how planning practice 
addresses the uncertainty of the future by thinking about how future might evolve instead 
of thinking about what to do about/by year 20XX.  While EU and MSP have time horizons 
for their scenarios, they are not important. RF and MSP explicitly ignored horizons and 
focused on plausible events and constructed stories around them. Thus, adopting the 
scenario planning lens has already moved planning actors away from the notion of 
planning for a future date, a time horizon and similar to the use in the business world 
emphasizes the use of multiple futures and how the organization can decisively respond in 
each future.  Furthermore, different management theorists have argued that diversity of 
opinion within the organization needs to be solicited because only such participation can 
make scenarios truly different, i.e. moving away from the probable to the possible.  
The key assumption is that organizations, unlike regions, can act as a single entity,.  
Land-use transportation scenario planning is fundamentally about inter-organization and 
inter-group coordination. Uncertainty is compounded because of the coordinative failures, 
as well as failure of understanding others, has meant that scenario planning in the public 
realm has taken on a slightly different flavor. The focus has become choosing and therefore 
committing the various participants to a single future rather than exploring the 
ramifications of different futures on different groups and how they might react to those. In 
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an effort to come to an agreement about collective goals in the future, much land use 
transportation scenario planning has ignored the usefulness of keeping different futures in 
play. For instance, while EU acknowledged that there are various possible patterns of 
development, EU’s approach was to presume that any one of those can be chosen and that 
once such a choice was made that the outcomes were predictable. In terms of strategic 
planning, goals and policies were identified based on how to achieve a selected end. Once 
the choice was made, the scenarios were no longer useful.  
On the other hand, RF was also trying to achieve a regional compact, though it was 
focused on agreement between various jurisdictions rather than broad public support. In 
creating and using those scenarios, RF achieved a regional compact similar to what Denver 
had achieved a decade earlier without the use of scenarios. However, the importance of the 
scenarios was to prepare the various jurisdictions to think about how a possible future 
might affect them.  The scenarios themselves were not discarded after the compact, 
recombination of different scenarios and responses are seen at later stages.  
All of the exercises presented diversity as something important to consider in the 
present and in the future. From geography to political ideology to inequity, some exercises 
attempted to form consensus about a single path of action while others sought to 
understand how different people would respond to various changes in the future. Only one 
of them, VFP accounted for impacts of these different futures on diverse groups. While the 
VFP relied on multiple future scenarios to motivate people to plan regionally in order to 
avoid most of the possible futures, they also helped the region think through what they 
might do if other futures unfolded. The participants in VFP were representatives of highly 
26 
 
diverse groups and the scenarios that were constructed and the way they were used is 
reflective of that effort.  
Participants in the scenario generation or vetting processes in the different cases 
drove the direction of the conversations and, in cases like Region Forward, led to foregone 
conclusions about future actions. Two of the projects paid limited attention to the social 
and economic issues that shaped their regions. This lack of attention may have been 
perceived as disconnected from the actual purpose of the projects, but other issues such as 
housing and workforce development were considered equally important to the future of 
the region. In the VFP project, the people in the room emphasized this point immediately, 
moving the project from one focused on growth management to one focused on regional 
inequity.  
The extent to which the people in the room drives the conversation, reinforces the 
opportunity for scenario planning to be an integral part of participatory planning. Indeed, 
with its focus on dialogue, and collaborative writing of scenarios, the process comes close 
to the ‘co-production’ of plans between professional and community member participants. 
Simultaneously, as discussed above who is co-creating these plans shapes their outcome.  
Further, planners should be clear when scenarios are being used an advocacy tools, 
versus an educational and/or decision making tool. Certainly both of these uses can 
interact, but planners and community members should be cognizant of the purpose of the 
scenarios. EU walked a careful line on this topic.  Because many smart growth advocates 
were instrumental in starting the EU, there was skepticism that if ‘sprawl scenario’ was 
selected by the larger public, it will be pursued. In response, EU organizers emphasized 
that they would support the collective choice irrespective of the outcome, and the scenarios 
27 
 
were pointed to as a demonstration of their commitment to the exploration of a range of 
outcomes. Their educational efforts paid off and a middle range scenario was selected.  
If the interest in scenario planning is to address the future’s underlying uncertainty, 
the impacts of and on the people living in places should be included in these processes 
moving beyond simply providing input into a constrained set of issues. Given the 
importance of major and minor stakeholders, sometimes to the exclusion of community 
stakeholders, there should be a better understanding of how these stakeholders do or do 
not capture the uncertainty of the future, how they represent community interests. If the 
most ‘radical’ scenarios depend on perspectives of all positions of society, scenario 
planners must consider new ways to bring these groups together that attend to their 
differences while encouraging their synergy.  
One of the underlying challenges planning practice faces and to which scenario 
planning can be specifically sensitive, is constructing the relationship between experts, 
major and minor stakeholders who may also be experts, and general community members. 
Overlaying the technical needs for modeling, necessary in some processes, with the 
knowledge and desires of stakeholders and community members requires diligence and 
care, something that publically funded agencies with limited funds and time can always 
attend to. However, the corporate approach to scenario planning emphasizes the support 
role that long-term forecasting plays in the construction of their scenarios. The models, 
when used, are not the scenarios. They are used along with the knowledge from the people 
in the room to construct the actual scenarios.  
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In scenario-planning circles, the lack of experience in dealing with multiple futures 
and diverse publics led to inadequate preparation for future uncertainty. The four cases we 
examined demonstrate the state of practice today. While the four processes effectively used 
multiple futures to varying degrees, they made less use of a broad conception of diversity 
to generate and use the scenarios. Instead of incorporating community members, they 
relied on professional participants. While it is clear that much has been achieved in 
scenario planning, much more needs to be done to ensure that planners are using the all 






Abbot, J. 2005. “Understanding and Managing the Unknown: The Nature of Uncertainty in 
Planning.” Journal of Planning Education and Research 24 (3): 237–251. 
Avin, U. P, and J. L Dembner. 2001. “Getting Scenario-Building Right.” Planning 67 (11): 22-
27. 
Bartholomew, Keith. 2007. “Land Use-Transportation Scenario Planning: Promise and 
Reality.” World Transit Research (January 1). 
http://www.worldtransitresearch.info/research/2313. 
Box, George E. P, and Norman Richard Draper. 1987. Empirical Model-building and Response 
Surfaces. New York: Wiley. 
Briggs, Xavier de Souza. 2008. Democracy as Problem Solving: Civic Capacity in Communities 
across the Globe. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, July 18. 
Chakraborty, Arnab, Nikhil Kaza, Gerrit-Jan Knaap, and Brian Deal. 2011. “Robust Plans and 
Contingent Plans -- Scenario Planning for an Uncertain World.” Journal of the American 
Planning Association 77 (3): 251-266. doi:10.1080/01944363.2011.582394. 
 Flyvbjerg, B. 2006. “Five misunderstandings about case-study research.” Qualitative 
inquiry 12 (2): 219. 
Forester, J. 2006. “Making participation work when interests conflict.” Journal of the 
American Planning Association 72 (4): 447–456. 
Greater Washington 2050. 2009. Big Moves: For shaping the future of greater Washington 




Hajer, Maarten A., and Hendrik Wagenaar. 2003. Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding 
Governance in the Network Society. Cambridge University Press, May 15. 
Harwood, S.A. and M.A. Zapata. 2006. “Preparing to Plan: Collaborative Planning in 
Monteverde, Costa Rica.” International Planning Studies 11(3): 187-207. 
Healey, P. 1998. "Collaborative Planning in a Stakeholders Society." Town Planning Review 
69 (1): 1 - 21.  
Van der Heijden, K. 1996. Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation. Chichester, UK: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Hopkins, L.D. and M.A. Zapata. (2007) "Engaging the Future: Tools for Effective Planning 
Practice. In Hopkins, L. D., and M. Zapata, eds. Engaging the Future: Forecasts, Scenarios, 
Plans and Projects. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1 - 18. 
Intriligator M, Sheshinski E. Toward a theory of planning. In: Heller W, Starr R, Starrett D, 
editors. Social Choice and Public Decision Making. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University 
Press; 1986. p. 135–58. 
Isserman, A. M. 1984. “Projection, Forecast, and Plan On the Future of Population 
Forecasting.” Journal of the American Planning Association 50 (2): 208-221. 
 Myers, Dowell, and Alicia Kitsue. 2000. “Constructing the future in planning: A survey of 
theories and tools.” Journal of Planning Education and Research 19: 221-231. 
Mutz, D. 2006. Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy. 
Cambridge University Press 
Nijman, Jan. 2010. Miami: Mistress of the Americas. Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, November 1. 
31 
 
Ogilvy, James A. 2002. Creating Better Futures: Scenario Planning as a Tool for a Better 
Tomorrow. Oxford University Press, USA, April 11. 
 
Ogilvy, J., and P. Schwartz. 1998. “Plotting Your Scenarios.” In Learning from the Future: 
Competitive Foresight Scenarios, edited by L. Fahey and R. M. Randall, 57–80. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Quay, Ray. 2010. “Anticipatory Governance.” Journal of the American Planning Association 
76 (4) (September 29): 496-511. doi:10.1080/01944363.2010.508428. 
Sandercock, L. 2004. “Towards a Planning Imagination for the 21st Century.” Journal of the 
American Planning Association 70 (2): 133-141. 
Scearce, D., and K. Fulton. 2004. What If?: The Art of Scenario Thinking for Nonprofits. Global 
Business Network. http://www.gbn.com/articles/pdfs/GBN_What%20If.pdf. 
Schwartz, P. 1996. The art of the long view: Planning for the future in an uncertain world. 
New York, NY: Doubleday. 
Shearer, Allan W. 2005. “Approaching Scenario-based Studies: Three Perceptions About the 
Future and Considerations for Landscape Planning.” Environment and Planning B: Planning and 
Design 32 (1): 67–87. 
Smith, Erik. 2007. Using a Scenario Approach: From Business to Regional Futures. In 
Engaging the Future: Using Forecasts, Scenarios, Plans, and Projects, ed. L. D Hopkins and M. 
A. Zapata, 79--101. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2007. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. 1st ed. 
Random House, April 17. 
Umemoto, Karen. 2001. “Walking in Another’s Shoes.” Journal of Planning Education and 
Research 21 (1): 17 -31.  
32 
 
Wachs, M. 1982. “Ethical Dilemmas in Forecasting for Public Policy.” Public Administration 
Review 1: 209-214. 
Wack, Pierre. 1985. “Scenarios: uncharted waters ahead” 63 (5): 73-89. 
Xiang, W.N. and K.C. Clarke. 2003. "The use of scenarios in land-use planning." Environment  
 
and Planning B: Planning and Design  30(6): 885 – 909. 
 
Yin, R.K. 2009. Case study research: design and methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Inc. 
 
Zapata, M.A. 2013. Five Years Later: how California community members acted on 
transformative learning achieved in a participatory planning process. Planning Theory and 










Table 2 Case selection and data collection procedure 
 Author involvement Data collection 
Envision Utah (EU) No direct research or 
primary participation 
Secondary data sources were collected from the 
project website, reports by APA and DOT, 
newspaper coverage and scholarly publications. 




Data from MWCOG updates, meeting minutes and 
public outreach documents; also, from reports in the 
local media.  
Maryland Scenario Project 
(MSP) 
Primary Participant Data from personal communication between NCSG 
staff and Scenario Advisory Group (SAG) 
workshops and from peer reviewed publications. 
Valley Future Project 
(VFP) 
Researched process  Primary data sources included interviews with 
process participants. Secondary data was collected 
from archival materials and newspaper articles. 
 
Table 2 Key features of the four case studies 








No Yes No Yes 
Scenario use 

















consider the future 



















Scenario A was 
used to demonstrate 
the effects of 
sprawl. 
“Hot and 
Gridlocked” was the 
doomsday scenario, 
which was projected 
from current 
practices. 
BAU was explicitly 
projected current 
economic structure 
into the future with 
no future 
investments. 
A base case was not 
established per se.  
Use after the 
process (MF-4) 
Serve as educational 
and advocacy tool; 
Select a preferred 
scenario 











Created by staff 
experts based on 








Small group of 
community leaders 
(not necessarily 





































identified as central 
to creating regional 
compact.  
While stakeholders 
were identified they 




Cross – sectional 
representation 








Scenario use  after 
the process (D-4) 
Educate and gain 
public support for 
smart-growth plan. 
While explicit use 
of the scenarios 
were not 
acknowledged the 




to reduction in 
government 




Not used beyond the 
process.  
Used to a create 
awareness about 
issues and advocate 
for regional 
cooperation.  
*MF = Multiple futures; D = Diversity  
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